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Since at least Holmstrom (1979), agency the-
orists and managerial accountants have analyzed 
what kinds of performance measures should be 
used in formal incentive contracts.1 For exam-
ple, when Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 
1996, 2001) proposed that company perfor-
mance be measured with a “balanced scorecard” 
of both financial and non-financial measures, 
accounting scholars envisioned its role only in 
formulaic compensation contracts.2
We describe an alternative view of the score-
card, in which its formal measures are created 
for and used in informal management. By 
“informal” we do not mean casual, haphazard, 
or capricious behavior, but instead managerial 
behavior not fully determined by rules or for-
mulas—where executives use discretion and 
judgment rather than managing solely “by the 
numbers.” Examples of informal management 
include adaptation, coordination, politics and 
influence, leadership, and informal authority.
Section I of this essay extends the use of for-
mal measures from formal to informal manage-
ment. We review the role of formal measures 
in formal agency contracts and then discuss 
relational incentive contracts that use infor-
mal weights on formal performance measures. 
More importantly, however, we depart from 
1 See Demski (2008) for a review.
2 For example, see Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997) or 
Lambert (2001).
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agency models entirely by suggesting roles for 
formal measures in other models of informal 
management.
Section II is both more novel and more 
speculative. Our focus shifts from using formal 
measures in informal management to devel-
oping informal management in the first place. 
Imposing ostensibly perfect measures on an 
organization from outside can work less well 
than having key stakeholders participate in 
developing their own, potentially inferior, per-
formance measures. In this sense, it is not the 
use of a balanced scorecard but rather its internal 
creation that can change an organization’s cul-
ture (defined below).
I. Using Formal Measures in Formal and 
Informal Management
Most models of performance measurement 
concern agency problems.3 In actual practice of 
course, managers use performance measures in 
many ways beyond compensation. We therefore 
begin with agency but then shift to other uses for 
performance measures.
A. Formal Measures in Agency Problems4
Consider the following example of a for-
mal measure in formal management.5 An 
agent’s total contribution to firm value is 
y =  f 1  a 1 +  f 2   a 2 + ε, whereas the agent’s mea-
sured performance is p =  g 1  a 1 +  g 2  a 2 + ϕ. 
3 Again, see Demski (2008) for a review.
4 Space constraints dictate that the descriptions of models 
be terse and their analyses non-existent. On agency models 
like those described here, see Gibbons (2010, Section 2) 
for an introduction and Gibbons and Roberts (2013) for a 
survey.
5 This basic model was developed by Feltham and Xie 
(1994) and is in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) and Baker (1992). 
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The agent’s total contribution to firm value, y, 
is too nuanced to be verifiable by an auditor 
or adjudicated by a court. The agent’s mea-
sured performance, p, however, is verifiable so 
that compensation contracts can take the form 
w = s + bp. If both parties are risk-neutral, 
with payoffs Π = y − w to the principal and 
U = w − c( a 1 ,  a 2 ) to the agent, the optimal 
bonus rate is b* =  ǁ f ǁ ___ǁ g ǁ  cos(θ), where θ is the 
angle between the coefficient vectors f and g.
Even in formal management, we can model 
how a balanced scorecard might be superior 
to purely financial measures. For example, 
the principal can pay k to change from p to a 
new measure q that has a smaller  θ . Another 
approach (which surfaces the idea that a score-
card contains multiple measures) is to imagine 
that paying k makes not only p but also q avail-
able, so that both measures can be used in the 
agent’s compensation formula.
As a first example of informal management (but still within an agency setting), we turn from 
formal to relational incentive contracts.6 In a 
repeated version of the setting above, the parties 
may be able to utilize y, even though it is not 
an auditable performance measure. Consider the 
relational incentive contract w = s + B(y). The 
first-best bonus function would be B(y) = y, but 
this bonus will not be feasible if the parties are 
too impatient, so the second-best equilibrium in 
the repeated game will entail B(y) < y.
This model of relational incentive contracts 
describes informal measures used in informal 
management. Formal measures could be added 
in several ways. Most simply, one could com-
bine the two models above: w = s + bp + B(y). 
More realistically, there could be a vector  p 
¯
of 
performance measures (as in a scorecard), not 
just a single measure p.
Continuing in this vein, consider 
informal weights on formal measures: 
w = s + bp + B(y) +  β(σ)p , where  σ is a sig-
nal that each party commonly observes but an 
auditor or court cannot. In fact, if y were “sub-
jective” (i.e., observed by only the principal) 
then needing to induce the principal to reveal y 
would create inefficiencies, so the parties might 
6 The classic models are MacLeod and Malcomson 
(1989) and Levin (2003). See Malcomson (2013) for a 
survey. 
prefer informal weights on formal measures, to 
the exclusion of any role for y.
Finally, in multi-lateral relational contracting (such as between a principal and two agents), if 
agent i’s output  y i is not observable to agent j, 
the parties might again prefer informal weights 
on formal measures, such as  β( σ i ) p i , if  σ i and 
p i are commonly observed by all three parties.
7
B. Beyond Agency
Organizations also use performance mea-
sures in many important roles beyond incentive 
contracting. Case studies of such uses include 
the interactive budgeting system at Johnson 
and Johnson (Simons 2000), benchmarking of 
clinical outcomes at a surgical practice (Porter, 
Deerberg-Wittram, and Marks 2014), aligning 
branded gasoline stations to a common value 
proposition (Kaplan 1996), and communicat-
ing  customer-service goals to bank employees (Campbell and Kazan 2014).
These and other uses of performance mea-
sures (and information systems more generally) 
relate to the growing literature on informa-
tion and decisions in organizations.8 Gibbons, 
Matouschek, and Roberts (2013)—henceforth, 
GMR—provide the following simple framework 
that nests many models from this literature:
 (i) The state of the world  s ∈ S is drawn 
from the distribution  f(s) .
 (ii) Player 1 privately observes the signal  θ 
drawn from the distribution  g(θ | s) .
 (iii) Player 1 chooses an influence action 
a ∈ A .
 (iv) Player 2 privately observes the signal  σ 
drawn from the distribution  h(σ | s, a) .
 (v) Player 2 chooses a decision  d ∈ D .
 (vi) The players receive payoffs  U i (s, a, d) 
for i = 1, 2.
7 See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994); Fuchs (2007); 
and Levin (2002) for models that have been or could be 
elaborated in these directions. 
8 See Gibbons (2010, Section 3) for an introduction.
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Prominent applications of this framework 
concern politics and influence, leadership, coor-
dination, and informal authority.9 Two points 
are more important for present purposes: (i) 
these are models of informal management10 and (ii) the framework can be used to explore the 
role of formal measures in such models.
As just one illustration of the latter, con-
sider specializing the framework to analyze 
adaptation and coordination.11 Let the state of 
the world have two dimensions: s = ( s 1 ,  s 2 ), 
where  s i =  s 0 +  ε i , and let θ =  s 1 and σ =  s 2 . 
Consider a team-theoretic model: U(s, a, d) = −α(a −  s 1 )2 − γ (a − d)2 − α(d −  s 2 )2 for 
both players, where α reflects the importance of 
adaptation and γ of coordination.
In this setting, it is easy to imagine an orga-
nization paying cost k to create a public sig-
nal η =  s 0 + ξ in stage (1). In addition, one 
could improve player i’s information about  s j , 
although the importance of coordination may 
limit how much information it is useful to con-
vey to individual decision-makers. Finally, if the 
players did not have identical interests, given 
the inefficiencies that arise in signaling models 
and the like, there could be roles for information 
systems that reduce the information available to 
interested parties.12
In sum, this subsection surfaces the impor-
tance of informal management beyond incentive 
contracting. More importantly, its primary pur-
pose has been to highlight the potential roles of 
formal measures for informal management. We 
envision a rich research stream that asks ques-
tions like Holmstrom’s (1979)—namely, how 
would one use a new performance measure and, 
hence, what value would it create?
9 See Milgrom and Roberts (1988); Hermalin (1998); 
and Aghion and Tirole (1997) for specific models, GMR 
Section 2 for further interpretations, and GMR Section 3 for 
enrichments.
10 To repeat, our definition of an informal management 
process is one where managerial behavior is not fully 
determined by rules, formulas, or contracts. In a model, 
one can tell that a decision is chosen informally if it is 
freely chosen rather than determined by a rule, formula, or 
contract—none of which appear in the framework.
11 See Dessein and Santos (2006); Alonso, Dessein, 
and Matouschek (2008); and Rantakari (2008) for richer 
treatments.
12 See Section 4 of GMR for existing work in this vein.
II. Developing Informal Management
An even more ambitious agenda asks how 
informal management arises in the first place. 
Rather than parachuting formal measures into a 
firm, managers who develop a balanced score-
card internally can discuss both why certain mea-
sures should be selected and how they should be 
used. The benefit from such a development pro-
cess was articulated well by Brian Baker, CEO 
of Mobil US Marketing and Refining, after six 
years of successful strategy execution with the 
balanced scorecard:
You could take our scorecard and give it 
to a competitor and it wouldn’t work. You 
had to have sweated through the hours 
and hours of work and effort that went 
behind the card to get the benefits from the 
measures. That’s what brings it to life. It’s 
got to become part of the company’s belief 
system, almost a religion—the  benefits 
don’t come just from having a piece of 
paper with a scorecard on it.13
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993) envisioned 
a firm that already had a well-understood strat-
egy. The firm selected financial and nonfinancial 
measures in a balanced scorecard to (i) allocate 
resources toward implementing the strategy, (ii) empower decentralized decision-makers to 
adapt to local conditions while remaining coor-
dinated around the overarching strategy (as in 
the example above), and (iii) assess the perfor-
mance of divisions and managers. Even in this 
setting, where the firm has a well-understood 
strategy, developing the scorecard internally 
communicates and builds agreement on how the 
scorecard measures will be used.
Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001) extended 
these ideas by considering a firm that does not 
yet have agreement about its strategy. Its inter-
nal development of a scorecard involved active 
debates about the strategy’s objectives and mea-
sures, including why certain measures were 
selected and others excluded.
Brian Baker’s comment illustrates that the 
process of developing the strategy’s perfor-
mance measures gives clarity to the strategy, 
helps to create a consensus among the executive 
team about the strategy and how it will be imple-
13 Baker (2000).
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mented, and builds understanding about how 
executive performance will be evaluated. In the 
spirit of Gibbons and Henderson (2013), these 
outcomes of developing a scorecard internally 
are examples of management practices that rely 
on relational contracts among the members of 
the executive team. As Gibbons and Henderson 
argue, such relational contracts require both 
“task” knowledge (of what is supposed to be 
done) and “relational” knowledge (of how man-
agers should react after unanticipated events 
occur).
Viewed through the lens of relational con-
tracting, developing a scorecard of formal 
measures internally creates not only the for-
mal measures themselves but also agreement 
among the participants about how the measures 
will be used in informal management. In this 
sense, the internal development of the scorecard 
helps to create a new corporate culture aligned 
to the strategy, where we define “culture” as 
described by Schein (2010)—shared assump-
tions about: mission, strategy, and goals; the 
means to achieve the goals; the measurement of 
results; and how to react when things do not go 
according to plan. We eagerly await new models 
of how the development and use of performance 
measures can play these complex roles in infor-
mal management.
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